Abstracts of published papers for Jac C. Heckelman
(below in chronological order; alternatively available organized by
subject instead)
(select papers below available in pdf format)
- Negative Voting Social Welfare Functions: A Characterization
Review of Economic Design forthcoming (pdf file)
Abstract. An Arrowian Social Welfare Function (SWF) represents a weak ordering
of the alternative set derived entirely from individual preference
orders. Negative voting considers only a voter's least preferred alternative.
We introduce the majority loser opposition property which requires
that any alternative ranked last by a majority of voters must be ranked
last in the social ordering. We show a SWF satisfies anonymity, neutrality,
reinforcement, continuity, and majority loser opposition if and only
if it is equivalent to negative voting.
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Targeting Inflation Targeting: The Influence of Interest Groups
(pdf)
(with Bonnie Wilson)
Public Choice 189: 533-554, 2021
Abstract. We examine whether sectional interest groups influence monetary policy goals in a manner consistent
with their interests as distributive coalitions. In particular, we explore whether bank groups and labor groups are
associated with the incidence of inflation targeting by the central bank. Controlling for a variety of economic and
institutional factors, our main findings reveal that bank groups are associated with a higher probability that a country
is an inflation targeter while labor groups are associated with a lower probability. The findings are conditional on the
level of democracy and on aspects of central bank independence.
- Characterizing Plurality using the Majoritarian Condition: A New Proof and Implications for Other Scoring Rules
(pdf)
Public Choice 189: 335-346, 2021
Abstract. Plurality rule selects whichever alternative is
most preferred by the greatest number of voters. The majoritarian
principle states that if a simple majority of voters agree on the
most preferred alternative, then it must be selected uniquely. Lepelley
(1992) adopts a proof by contradiction approach to show that plurality
is the only scoring rule satisfying the majoritarian principle. We
make use of the relationship that majoritarianism implies faithfulness
to present a new proof allowing us to derive limits on the size of
the group for which a particular scoring rule will satisfy majoritarianism
without restricting voter preferences. We then determine the limits
for three specific faithful scoring rules where voters rank the alternatives:
positive/negative voting, wherein one point is awarded to a voter's
top preference and one point is subtracted from a voter's bottom preference;
Borda, in which an equal increase in points is awarded to each successively
higher rank; and Dowdall, for which rank points entail an harmonic
sequence. Comparing these rules by the sizes of group and alternative
set combinations for which they are majoritarian we find that Borda
is dominated by positive/negative voting, and both are dominated by
Dowdall. We also derive the relative point gaps between certain pairs
of rankings beyond which a scoring rule will not be majoritarian for
any group of more than two voters.
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Don’t You be My Neighbor:
Support for Racial-Exclusion Constitutional Provisions in Mid-19th Century Indiana and Illinois
(pdf)
(with John Dinan)
American Politics Research 49: 504-516, 2021
Abstract. Racially discriminatory provisions in the U.S. Constitution and southern state constitutions
have been extensively analyzed, but insufficient attention has been brought to these provisions when included in
northern state constitutions. We examine constitutional provisions excluding blacks from entering the state that were
adopted by Midwestern states in the mid-19th Century. Previous scholarship has focused on the statements and votes
of the convention delegates who framed these provisions. However, positions taken by delegates need not have aligned
with the views of their constituents. Delegates to state constitutional conventions held in Illinois in 1847,
Indiana in 1851, and Oregon in 1857 opted to submit to voters racial-exclusion provisions separate from the vote to
approve the rest of the constitution. We exploit this institutional feature by using county-level election returns in
Illinois and Indiana to test claims about the importance of partisan affiliation, religious denomination,
social-welfare policy concerns, labor competition, and racial-threat theory in motivating popular support for
entrenching racially discriminatory policies in constitutions. We find greater levels of support for racial
exclusion in areas where Democratic candidates polled better and areas closer to slave-holding states where
social-welfare policy concerns would be heightened. We find lower levels of support for racial exclusion
in areas (in Indiana) with greater concentrations of Quakers. Our findings are not consistent with labor competition
or racial-threat theories.
-
The Probability of Violating Arrow's Conditions
(pdf)
(with Keith Dougherty)
European Journal of Political Economy
65, 101936, 2020
Abstract. Arrow's impossibility theorem shows that all preference aggregation rules (PARs) must violate a specific set of normative conditions (transitivity, Pareto, IIA, nondictatorship) over an unrestricted domain of preference profiles. However, the theorem does not address which PARs are more likely to violate those conditions across preference profiles. We compare the probabilities that ten PARs (plurality, anti-plurality, Hare, Nanson, Simpson-Kramer, Borda, Copeland, Dowdall, Coombs, and pairwise majority) violate Arrow's conditions. We prove that Borda, Copeland, Dowdall, and Coombs are less likely to violate IIA than the first five PARs, and they are less likely to violate Arrow's conditions jointly. In contrast, pairwise majority never violates IIA but can violate transitivity. Simulations with three alternatives reveal that among the PARs studied, pairwise majority is the most likely to satisfy Arrow's conditions jointly. Our results suggest pairwise majority represents a low probability of an intransitive social preference whereas the others represent much higher probabilities of an IIA violation. The trade-off may depend on the importance of avoiding cycles versus a rule's vulnerability to strategic voting.
-
Symmetric Scoring Rules and a New Characterization of the Borda Count (pdf)
(with Robi Ragan)
Economic Inquiry
59: 287-299, 2020
Abstract. Young developed a classic axiomatization of the Borda rule almost 50 years ago. He proved it is the only voting rule satisfying the normative properties of decisiveness, neutrality, reinforcement, faithfulness and cancellation. Often overlooked is the uniqueness of Borda applies only to variable populations. We present a different set of properties which only Borda satisfies when both the set of voters and the set of alternatives can vary. It is also shown Borda is the only scoring rule which will satisfy all of the new properties when the number of voters stays fixed.
-
Support for Progressive Reforms: Evidence from California's 1911 Referenda
(pdf)
(with John Dinan)
Journal of Interdisciplinary History
51: 209-234, 2020
Abstract. Adoption of important reforms during the Progressive Era has prompted scholars to study who supported these reforms and whether their support was uniform. In this article, we investigate support for Progressive reforms by analyzing county-level election results in a 1911 California special election. Voters in that election considered state constitutional amendments addressing a range of issues, including women suffrage, direct democracy, home rule, worker safety, and business regulation. We find that certain socially active Protestant denominations supported most of these reforms. Otherwise, there was little uniformity in group support for these measures. Urban counties supported multiple reforms while opposing women suffrage. Meanwhile, counties with greater wealth, proportion of immigrants, and several other religious denominations were associated with support for particular reforms but had no effect on support for any other reforms. Although leaders and chroniclers of the movement typically claimed that Progressivism was a coherent movement, our study lends support to scholars who have challenged this interpretation, by showing the varied patterns of support for Progressive reforms and the notable divergence in support for women suffrage compared with other reforms.
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Stability and Contingency in Federalism Preferences
(pdf)
(with John Dinan)
Public Administration Review
80: 234-243, 2020
Abstract. We analyze Americans’ preferences for making policy at the national versus subnational level. Relying on a Pew survey question posed in multiple recent years, we investigate the relationship between partisanship and ideology and support for decentralization and analyze whether support is affected by which party controls the presidency and Congress. As expected, Republicans and conservatives are more supportive of decentralization and Democrats and liberals are less supportive. However, Republicans and Democrats respond in an asymmetric fashion to changes in party control of the federal government. Republicans’ support for decentralization is relatively unaffected by changes in party control, whereas Democrats’ support for decentralization increases when Republicans control the federal government. For public administration scholars and practitioners, these results indicate that federalism-based appeals in American politics tap into stable views about the allocation of policy authority on the part of a sub-set of the electorate and in ways that can influence public officials’ level of support for decentralization.
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The Growth-Maximizing Level of Regulation: Evidence from a Panel of International Data
(pdf)
(with Bonnie Wilson)
European Journal of Political Economy
59: 354-368, 2019
Abstract. Existing evidence suggests that regulation diminishes economic growth. In theory, however, regulation may be either growth-enhancing or diminishing. We therefore empirically revisit the relation between regulation and growth, allowing for both positive and negative effects. In an unbalanced panel of 132 countries over eight time periods, we find evidence of a hump-shape relation between regulation and growth. The estimates imply that for more than 95% of the sample the total effect of regulation on growth is positive. The estimates also imply that about 60% of the sample observations are associated with over-regulation, relative to the growth-maximizing level. Similar findings apply to the (majority) subsample of non-OECD nations in the dataset. However, for the (minority) subsample of OECD nations, both the total and marginal effects of regulation on growth are negative.
-
Collective Action
Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume I
(Roger Congleton, Bernard Grofman, and Stephan Voight (eds.)), Oxford University Press, pp. 467-488, 2019
Abstract. The theory of collective action, as outlined by Mancur Olson, is presented. Olson argued individuals are subject to free riding behavior which can be overcome by selective incentives. The larger the potential group, the greater the hurdles to successful formation. Thus, smaller groups with more narrow interests are more likely to form, leading to an emphasis on policy reform that concentrates benefits to the group while diffusing the costs on greater society. The accumulation of such groups will slow growth, and this sclerotic effect is reversed due to institutional instability. This chapter develops a critical appraisal of the theory and the accumulated evidence in the literature which follows from Olson.
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Voting on Prohibition: Disentangling Preferences on Federalism and Alcohol
(pdf)
(with John Dinan)
Social Science History
43: 113-130, 2019
Abstract. We contribute to an understanding of the determinants of voter support for U.S. prohibition policies in the early 1900s, by separating substantive preferences for wet versus dry policies from preferences for centralized versus decentralized control. Prior studies of prohibition referenda have generated various conclusions about which groups supported and opposed prohibition, whether regarding the role of religion, urban/rural residence, immigrant status, gender, or class. But none of these studies has considered the impact of preferences regarding decentralization on voter support for prohibition measures. We exploit a combination of referenda unique to the 1933 Ohio ballot, where voters considered prohibition-repeal measures alongside a county home-rule amendment. By viewing support for home-rule as a proxy for decentralization preferences we clarify and explain anomalies in prior studies regarding determinants of support for prohibition and its repeal, especially regarding urban counties and some Evangelical denominations, which are shown to have been guided by a preference for local control of alcohol policy, and counties with larger proportions of women, which are associated with greater support for more centralized and uniform alcohol policy.
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Political Selection of Federal Reserve Bank Cities
(pdf file)
(with John Wood)
Public Choice and Economic History,
((Joshua Hall and Marcus Witcher (eds.)), Springer, pp. 135-153, 2018
Abstract. The Federal Reserve Act (1913) established the Reserve Board Organization Committee (RBOC) to determine the number and location of Federal Reserve districts and Reserve banks. Some scholars argue that the decisions were politically motivated but direct econometric evidence is lacking. A regression model utilizing solely political variables correctly predicts 11 of the 12 selected cities; the exception being Cleveland's selection over Cincinnati. Our results present direct evidence of the importance of political determinants for RBOC selection.
-
Fractionalization and Economic Freedom
(pdf)
(with Bonnie Wilson)
Public Finance Review
46: 158-176, 2018
Abstract. Diversity is often thought to create conflict and harm economic institutions. We hypothesize, however, that the impact of diversity on economic institutions is conditional on political institutions, and may be negative in some settings but positive in others, due to differences in the nature of rent seeking in different regimes. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the impact of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization on economic freedom, conditional on the level of political rights. We find that the marginal impact of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization on economic freedom is positive in the most democratic nations, and that the marginal impact of ethnic fractionalization is negative in the most autocratic nations. Our results suggest that the nature of the relation between diversity and economic institutions may be more complicated than prior literature conveys.
-
How Global is Globalization?
(pdf)
(with Andrew Young)
Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy
48: 83-93, 2018
Abstract.
We examine a balanced panel of globalization indices for 129 countries over the years 1991-2010. We report evidence of cross-country sigma convergence in the overall globalization index. Sigma convergence also holds for each of the economic, political, and social globalization indices, as well as each sub-index within these indices. However, the evidence for stochastic convergence, based on panel unit root tests, is only strong for the political globalization index. Regarding the economic and social dimensions of globalization, respectively, we find evidence for stochastic convergence only in the flows and cultural proximity sub-indices. For the OECD subsample, evidence supports stochastic convergence for the overall, economic and political globalization indices. Evidence to support regional convergence among the non-OECD nations on various globalization dimensions is much more limited. Our findings indicate that globalization convergence is truly global only on the political dimension.
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A Social Choice Analysis of the Selection of Federal Reserve Bank Cities
(pdf)
Open Journal of Economics and Finance
1: 30-36, 2017
Abstract. The Federal Reserve Act (1913) established the Reserve Board Organization Committee (RBOC) to determine the number and location of Federal Reserve districts and Reserve banks. As part of their information gathering, the RBOC conducted two polls of national banks. One poll requested preferences on up to 12 cities, and the other requested a rank ordering of the top three. We analyze these votes and show that the selected cities are not wholly consistent with either poll. An aggregation based on simple plurality vote sorted by district correctly identifies 11 of the 12 selected cities; the exception being Cleveland's selection over Pittsburgh. Other aggregation methods analyzed here predict fewer of the selected cities, and we show that any other scoring rule would be inconsistent with at least one of the 12 selections.
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The (Questionable) Importance of New York at the Constitutional Convention
(pdf)
(with Paul Carlsen)
Journal of Early American History
7: 237-261, 2017
Abstract. The U.S. Constitution was first developed at the 1787 Convention, where each state's vote was determined by the majority preference of its delegates. Two of the delegates from New York, John Lansing and Robert Yates, both strident anti-Federalists, left the convention early due to disagreement with the proceedings. Their departure cost New York its vote for the rest of the Convention, and has been considered by some scholars to be an important event. We investigate how often New York's vote was critical to proposals passing or failing, both when present and counter-factually when absent. We find New York's vote could have been critical on only 28 of 578 (roughly 5%) votes. Most of the 28 votes were on nominal issues. However, paradoxically, it appears that a more favorable outcome for Lansing and Yates might have occurred had New York also missed the very first vote of the Convention and the last vote on apportionment prior to “The Great Compromise”.
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Tullock on the Organization of Scientific Inquiry
(pdf)
Constitutional Political Economy
28: 1-17, 2017
Abstract. In The Organization of Inquiry (1966), Gordon Tullock sets out to establish how knowledge is developed and dispersed in science, to such a high degree of reliability, despite the lack of formal organizational structure. He contrasts this against the unreliability of the "non-sciences". In this essay, I review his perspective and consider the validity of his proposed reforms.
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A Note on Neutrality and Majority Rule with an Application to State Votes at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 (pdf)
Public Choice
167: 245-255, 2016
Abstract. Majority rule used in the legislative process has a bias toward the status quo. This implies that proposals are less likely to pass when the number of voters casting either "yes" or "no" votes sums to an even number rather than an odd number. The implication is weakly supported by examining state votes of 552 motions made at the 1787 Constitutional Convention. A difference is found in the expected direction but is not statistically significant at traditional levels.
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State Bloc versus Individual Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention: Did it Make a Difference? (pdf)
(with Paul Carlsen)
Southern Economic Journal
82: 781-800, 2016
Abstract. Voting at the 1787 Constitutional Convention followed the procedure of requiring state votes to be determined by the majority vote of each state’s present delegates, and the outcome of the vote to be decided by majority vote of the states. In establishing the new legislature, the adopted Constitution set rules such that a simple majority of all present representatives would determine the outcome of each legislative vote. We investigate how Convention vote outcomes might have changed if this voting rule was in place for the Convention. Using spatial models on 398 separate roll calls we identify which vote outcomes would have differed under individual delegate voting. Analysis suggests only 16 of the vote outcomes would have changed but those that were predicted to change included considering unequal representation in the Senate (i.e., similar to representation in the House) and requiring 2/3rds (rather than 3/4ths) of states to ratify constitutional amendments.
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Interest Groups, Democracy, and Policy Volatility (pdf)
(with Bonnie Wilson)
Contemporary Economic Policy
34: 223-233, 2016
Abstract. Democratic polities appear to produce more stable policy than do autocracies. In this paper, we explore a potential source of the policy stability observed in democracies: special-interest groups. We find that interest groups are associated with greater stability in some measures of policy and that groups mediate the stabilizing impact of democracy on policy. We also find that the impact of interest groups on policy volatility depends on the degree of polarization in a society.
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Properties and Paradoxes of Common Voting Rules
Handbook of Social Choice and Voting,
((Jac C. Heckelman and Nicholas R. Miller (eds.)), Edward Elgar Press, pp. 263-283, 2015
Abstract. This chapter describes common practical voting rules used to choose among multiple alternatives, including those that assign scores to each alternative based on a voter's ranking, those that require majority support and utilize run-offs if necessary, those that are based on pairwise majority rule, and those that involve proportional lotteries. This chapter compares these rules with respect to their normative properties and provides examples that illustrate seemingly 'paradoxical' violations of such properties by particular voting rules.
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Economic Freedom Convergence Clubs
Economic Behavior, Entrepreneurship and Economic Freedom,
((Richard J. Cebula et al. (eds.)), Edward Elgar Press, pp. 102-114, 2015
Abstract. It has become conventional wisdom that institutional quality is a pre-eminent factor in growth and development. For a sample of 97 countries I find that an overall measure of economic freedom has been increasing over time yet disparities in economic freedom across countries are significantly increasing. Thus, absolute convergence on economic freedom is not occurring. However, convergence across countries is occuring for roughly half of the different categories comprising the aggregated economic freedom measure. Furthermore, many of the distinct regions are showing significant evidence of convergence within their regions, on several types of economic freedoms.
-
Interest Groups and the ‘Rise and Decline’ of Growth
(pdf)
(with Bonnie Wilson)
Southern Economic Journal
81: 435-456, 2014
Abstract. Interest groups are known to exert a sclerotic impact on mean growth, á la Mancur Olson (1982). It is unknown, however, what (if any) impact groups exert on the volatility of growth - an important hindrance to development. In this paper, we first consider what impact we should expect Olson groups to have on the volatility of growth. We then estimate the relation between groups and growth volatility in a cross-country panel, using System GMM. The findings indicate that groups are associated with growth stability. In addition, the findings suggest that interest groups may be a source of the stability observed in democracies.
- Support for Repealing Prohibition: An Analysis of State-wide Referenda on Ratifying the 21st Amendment (pdf)
(with John Dinan)
Social Science Quarterly
95: 636-651, 2014
Abstract. Objectives: The 21st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution repealing national prohibition is the only amendment ratified by state conventions rather than state legislatures. The referenda held to select delegates for these conventions offer a promising source of data for identifying determinants of support for prohibition repeal.
Methods: We use various proxy measures to determine the importance of economic, political, and demographic forces in motivating support for electing pro-repeal delegate slates to state ratifying conventions.
Results: Urbanization, per-capita income, percentage of Catholics, and support for the Democratic Party were correlated with support for prohibition repeal. Neither the percentage of Evangelical denominations, gender distribution, nor foreign-born population appeared to significantly influence referenda returns.
Conclusions: This study confirms the conventional understanding regarding Catholic opposition to prohibition and higher-income areas' support for repeal. The findings also indicate that congressional backers of repeal were correct in calculating that submitting the 21st amendment to popularly elected state conventions, rather than rural-dominated state legislatures, would improve the chances of ratification. Moreover, support for repeal among Democratic congressmembers and party leaders appears to have extended to rank-and-file Democratic voters as well.
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A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention
(pdf)
(with Keith Dougherty)
Journal of Economic History
73: 407-444, 2013
Abstract. Previous studies of the U.S. Constitutional Convention have relied on votes recorded for the state blocs or a relatively small number of delegate votes. We construct a new dataset covering delegate votes on over 600 substantive roll calls, and use the data in several ways. First, we estimate a single dimensional position for the delegates which reflects their overall voting patterns. Next, we explain these positions using a variety of delegate and constituent variables. Finally, we suggest a method for identifying state and floor medians, which can be used to predict equilibrium outcomes at the Convention.
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Institutions, Lobbying, and Economic Performance
(pdf)
(with Bonnie Wilson)
Economics & Politics
25: 360-386, 2013
Abstract. We investigate whether the impact of institutions depends not just on their current state, but also on how they came to be. In particular, we hypothesize that while economic freedom that emerges spontaneously may be growth promoting, economic freedom that emerges as a result of costly lobbying efforts may be less fruitful. In an extreme case, costly lobbying efforts may even negate the growth-enhancing effect of economic freedom. To the extent that lobbying efforts constitute an opportunity cost of resources diverted away from investment and production, our hypothesis also implies that the opportunity cost of lobbying is greater the more efficient is the institutional environment. Panel data analysis reveals the expected positive relation between economic freedom and growth, and consistent with our hypothesis, the findings indicate that the impact of economic freedom on growth does indeed diminish as lobbying efforts increase. In addition, we find that lobbying is more harmful to growth at greater levels of economic freedom.
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Income Convergence among U.S. States: Cross-Section and Time Series Evidence (pdf)
Canadian Journal of Economics
46: 1085-1109, 2013
Abstract. We perform convergence tests on the U.S. states for per capita income from 1930-2009. Cross-sectional tests support overall sigma convergence and beta convergence but may not hold true for the last three decades. Time series tests suggest that about half of the states exhibit stochastic convergence and of these all are also beta converging. Probit regressions reveal that the likelihood a state is converging is a function of changing capital to labor ratios, the size of the agricultural sector, and levels of taxation and tax revenue. Regional disparities in convergence remain among the southern and midwestern states.
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Empirical Evidence Regarding Regional Political Convergence in the United States
(pdf)
(with John Dinan)
Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy
43: 170-177, 2013
Abstract. Previous studies of U.S. political polarization have examined state-level convergence and divergence. Increasingly, scholars have turned from state-level analyses to regional analyses and advanced claims as to whether regions are becoming more similar or dissimilar. Yet, formal testing has remained largely absent. Using panel unit root tests, we determine whether regional political convergence is occurring between 1970 and 2004. Our results suggest the importance of distinguishing between ideological convergence and partisan convergence. We find the four regions and eight subregions are stochastically converging to a national norm in regard to ideology but not with regard to partisanship. Convergence for partisanship is, however, occurring within three of the regions, but not within the Midwest.
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Are We There Yet? On the Convergence of Financial Reforms
(pdf)
(with Sandeep Mazumder)
Economics of Governance
14: 385-409, 2013
Abstract. Since the 1970s, there have been substantial financial reforms across
the world, however little research has been devoted to studying the
convergence path of these reforms. While Abiad and Mody (2005) find that
there is movement towards a global 'norm' of financial reform, their
findings are based upon a cross-sectional approach that has been widely
criticized in the literature. In this paper we offer new time-series
evidence on the convergence of financial reforms both across and within
regions, which can also act as a metric to measure just how globalized
are countries' financial systems. We find that some regions of the
world have fully converged, but the advanced economies and Sub-Saharan
Africa are not converging. In addition, while most countries have
fully converged within their own region, notable exceptions are also
identified. These results suggest that while financial reforms have
largely become homogenized, important distinctions still remain.
-
Cross-country Convergence of Financial Reforms
(pdf)
European Economics Letters
2: 20-23, 2013
Abstract. Financial liberalization indicators are tested for sigma convergence and divergence. Sigma convergence requires a significant reduction in the dispersion across nations over time whereas sigma divergence entails a significant increase in dispersion. Using the standard deviation and a linear trend, sigma divergence is supported for an index of capital accounts openness, but sigma convergence is supported for an index of domestic financial sector liberalization. Using instead the coefficient of variation, which accounts for the upward trend in each of the measures, strong evidence is found in support of sigma convergence for both measures. This latter result holds for both advanced and developing nations.
- Strategy Proof Scoring Rule Lotteries for Multiple Winners
(pdf)
(with Fred Chen)
Journal of Public Economic Theory
15: 108-123, 2013
Abstract. We develop a lottery procedure for selecting multiple winners that is strategy
proof. The rule assigns points to each candidate based on any standard scoring
rule method, and then uses one draw to select a single winning set of candidates in
proportion to their collective score. In addition to being strategy proof, the lottery
rule is also shown to have several other attractive normative properties. Violations of
some other important normative properties are noted as well.
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A New Dataset of Delegate Positions on all Substantive Roll Calls at the U.S. Constitutional Convention
(pdf)
(with Keith Dougherty, Paul Carlsen, and David Gelman)
Historical Methods
45: 135-141, 2012
Abstract. Delegate level analysis of the U.S. Constitutional Convention has been limited because the Convention did not record delegate votes. This paper introduces the Constitutional Convention Research Group Data Set (CCRG dataset), which contains inferred delegate votes on 620 substantive roll calls at the Convention. The CCRG dataset represents a significant improvement over previous datasets such as those compiled by McDonald (1958), Dougherty and Heckelman (2009), and datasets based on votes recorded for state blocs (Jillson 1981, 1988).
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Has Assistance from USAID Been Successful in Promoting and Sustaining Democracy? Evidence from the Transition Economies of Eastern Europe and Eurasia (pdf)
(with Andreas Freytag)
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
168: 636-657, 2012.
Abstract. Foreign aid, especially official development assistance (ODA), has received increasing criticism in past decades. In particular, it has been put into question if and to what extent aid can help foster the aims for which it has been paid. In most cases, it seems that there is no discernable effect or even a negative effect of ODA on economic development. One reason for aid ineffectiveness may be seen in a lack of good governance on the side of the recipients. It has been argued that aid should concentrate more on creating better institutions. In the past 20 years, democracy promotion has become a pillar of USAID's mission and the funding for democracy and governance has steadily increased. The transition economies in particular have received special attention upon the fall of the Soviet Union. We assess the success of this aid by testing whether US aid is enhancing democracy in 26 transition countries. Using Freedom House Nations in Transit data, we find that in simple linear panel regressions aid has generally not been a significant factor in a country's overall democracy score. However, aid has significantly contributed to certain components of the democracy score, namely civil society, electoral process, judicial framework, and media independence. In addition, the impact of aid is found to depend on the number of years of past central planning. Countries having a history of less than 50 years of central planning had a significantly negative association to aid, whereas countries with more than 65 years of central planning benefited from greater aid.
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Crossing the Threshold : An Analysis of IBRD Graduation Policy (pdf)
(with Stephen Knack and Halsey Rogers)
Review of International Organizations
7: 145-176, 2012
Abstract. According to World Bank policy, countries remain eligible to borrow from the IBRD until they
are able to sustain long-term development without further recourse to Bank financing. Graduation
from IBRD is not an automatic consequence of reaching a particular income level, but rather is
supposed to be based on a determination of whether the country has reached a level of institutional
development and capital-market access that enables it to sustain its own development process without
recourse to Bank funding. This paper takes a positive approach to IBRD graduation policy,
investigating what income and non-income factors appear to have influenced graduation status in
recent decades, based on panel data for 1982 through 2009. Explanatory variables include the per-
capita income of the country, as well as measures of institutional development and market access that
are cited as criteria by the graduation policy, and other plausible explanatory variables that capture the
levels of economic development and vulnerability of the country. We find that the observed correlates
of graduation status are generally consistent with the stated policy. Countries that are wealthier, more
creditworthy, more institutionally developed, and are less vulnerable to trade, financial, and other
shocks are more likely to be graduates. Predicted probabilities generated by the model conform
closely to the actual graduation and de-graduation experiences of Trinidad and Tobago and Korea, and
suggest that Hungary and Latvia may have graduated prematurely - a prediction subsequently borne
out by the large loans that they later received from the IBRD in the wake of the global financial crisis.
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Do Political Freedoms Attract or Discourage Foreign Direct Investment? Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union
Developing Economies: Innovation, Investment and Sustainability,
(Joanne M. Carcillo (ed.)), Nova Science, pp. 175-186, 2012
Abstract. The evidence on the relationship between political freedoms and foreign direct investment (FDI) is mixed. Part of the problem in interpreting results is that past cross-country studies have generally used a large sample of diverse nations and broad measures of political freedoms which do not vary much over time. In this chapter the relationship between political freedoms and FDI in the Central and Eastern European and Former Soviet Union nations is analyzed using recently developed political freedom indexes by Freedom House specific to the transition economies, over the period 1999-2008. By focusing on a specific region of the world which has undergone recent dramatic change in its political institutions, both in terms of positive reforms in certain nations and increased repression in others, a better estimation of the true impact of political freedom can be determined. It is found that greater political freedoms in general discourage FDI. However, not all types of political freedoms significantly hinder FDI. In particular, freedoms related to judicial framework, civil society, and corruption significantly limit FDI, while freedoms related to electoral process and governance do not. Finally, the results for media independence are dependent on specification.
- Testing For Aggregation Bias in a Non-Linear Framework: Some Monte Carlo Results
(pdf)
International Journal of Statistics and Economics
8: 1-11, 2012
Abstract. Researchers modeling the behavior of individual people or firms are often unable to utilize micro-level data because such data are unavailable or unreliable. Faced with this dilemma, researchers often resort to using aggregate-level data. When the individual-level variable of interest is dichotomous, however, the aggregate-level model is subject to a special form of aggregation bias. Kelejian [1994] provides a methodology for testing for the presence of this form of bias. This study uses Monte Carlo analysis to evaluate the usefulness of Kelejian's test. Using 50 units, populated by, 100, 1000 and 10,000 individuals, we find that aggregation bias is almost universally present. Unfortunately, the Kelejian test identifies the bias in fewer than half of the cases.
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Special Interest Groups and Growth
(pdf)
(with Dennis Coates and Bonnie Wilson)
Public Choice
147: 439-457, 2011
Abstract. This paper empirically explores the
relation between special-interest groups and economic growth. Our analysis exploits
newly assembled data on the number of groups observed across
countries and time, in order to mitigate the identification problems associated with earlier studies.
Also in contrast to earlier work, we examine the impact of groups on two sources of growth - capital accumulation and technological change - in addition to the impact of groups on output growth.
The findings are consistent with Mancur Olson's (1982) claim that societies with
greater numbers of interest groups grow slower, accumulate less
capital, and experience reduced productivity growth relative to
others.
- The Connection between Democratic Freedoms and Growth in Transition Economies (pdf)
Applied Economics Quarterly
56: 121-146, 2010
Abstract. The Freedom House democracy index is often used in regression analysis to estimate the relationship between democratic freedoms
and growth. The index is comprised of two broad categories for political rights and civil liberties. However, the relationship between the underlying types of rights
and liberties to growth remains unknown. A newer alternative democracy index developed by Freedom House specifically for the transition nations is compared
to the original democracy index. The two are highly correlated but the latter entails a greater breakdown across six democracy areas including civil society,
judicial framework, media independence, corruption, electoral process, and governance. Except for corruption, each is found to be individually significant in
separate growth regressions, but when all are included simultaneously, only greater freedoms in civil society and electoral process are significantly correlated
with higher growth, while greater freedom in judicial framework is significantly correlated with lower growth. The remaining areas are not statistically significant.
-
Aid and Democratization in the Transition Economies
(pdf)
Kyklos
63: 558-579, 2010
Abstract. Past studies have not been supportive of the ability for foreign aid to create increased development and market liberalization. Less attention has been devoted to investigating the role aid has played in fostering democratic institutions. For a sample of 26 nations in Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics, I find more aid per capita is strongly associated with democratic reforms, but less robust is the relationship for aid as a percentage of gross national income. When analyzing various types of democratic freedoms, it appears both measures of aid improve the categories of judicial framework and governance, and aid per capita is also positively correlated with improvements in civil society and electoral process, but aid does not lead to more media independence.
-
Majority Rule Versus Supermajority Rules: Their Effects on Narrow and Broad Taxes
(pdf)
(with Keith Dougherty)
Public Finance Review
38: 738-761, 2010
Abstract. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) argue that larger supermajority rules reduce tyranny of the majority but should have no effect on the passage of mutually advantageous policies. We test this argument by separately analyzing the effect of supermajority requirements on taxes that are targeted toward narrow groups (more redistributive) and taxes targeted toward a broader base (less redistributive), in a panel of 50 states from 1970 to 2008. Regression analysis reveals an inverse relationship between narrow taxes and the size of the majority rule requirement, and no relationship between broad taxes and the size of the majority requirement -- consistent with Buchanan and Tullock's claim. We also find that Democratic controlled governments have significantly higher tax rates on narrow taxes than Republican controlled governments. The reverse is found for broad taxes, but the result is not as strong.
-
Corruption and the Institutional Environment for Growth
(pdf)
(with Benjamin Powell)
Comparative Economic Studies
52: 351-378, 2010
Abstract. Several cross-country studies have found that corruption is detrimental to economic growth, but the findings are not universally robust. We utilize the economic freedom index to examine if corruption can facilitate growth by allowing entrepreneurs to avoid inefficient policies and regulations when economic freedom is limited. Using regression analysis, we find that corruption is growth enhancing when economic freedom is most limited but the beneficial impact of corruption decreases as economic freedom increases. Not all areas of economic freedom affect the corruption-growth relationship equally. In particular, we find the beneficial effect of corruption disappears most quickly when the size of government and the extent of regulation decrease.
-
Convergence and Divergence in State Political Behavior,
1970-2004
(pdf)
(with John Dinan)
Social Science Journal
47: 689-698, 2010
Abstract. In view of the ongoing debate about the degree and direction of political polarization in the U.S., we
assess whether the 50 states are converging or diverging in their behavior in state and federal elections.
We find that states are diverging in their behavior in federal elections but converging in their behavior in
state elections. Previous scholars have shown the need to distinguish between the degree of polarization
of elites and ordinary citizens; our findings demonstrate the further need to distinguish between trends
in partisan polarization at the federal and state level.
-
Personalty Interests at the Constitutional Convention:
New Tests of the Beard Thesis (pdf)
(with Keith Dougherty)
Cliometrica
4: 207-228, 2010
Abstract. Charles Beard ([1913] 2004) argued that the U.S. Constitution was created to advance the interests of people who owned personalty, particularly those at the Constitutional Convention. Because delegate votes on individual clauses at the Constitutional Convention were not publicly recorded, prior empirical analyses have been limited to inferred votes on a specific set of unrelated clauses. We extend this inquiry by inferring votes related to currency and debt issues which Beard put forth as the prime issues for those who owned personalty. Our analysis on these votes generates little support for a narrow version of the Beard thesis, which states that all personalty groups voted in a unified coalition at the Convention and supported the Constitution. Our analysis provides some support, however, for a broader interpretation that personalty and realty interests affected delegate voting behavior at the margin.
-
The Political Economy of Investment: Sclerotic Effects from Interest Groups
(pdf)
(with Dennis Coates and Bonnie Wilson)
European Journal of Political Economy
26: 208-221, 2010
Abstract. We investigate the relationship between interest group activity and investment by analyzing an unbalanced panel of observations on 126 countries over three time-periods. We find that the number of interest
groups in a nation is negatively related to investment, consistent with a sclerotic effect due to rent-seeking
by interest groups. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of a variety of additional common controls
in the specification, to potential outlying observations, and to varied sample selection procedures. We
do find, however, that the sclerotic impact of groups on investment is stronger across developed OECD
countries than for the developing non-OECD countries. Effects also tend to be stronger in democratic
nations, but are dependent upon how strict a definition of democracy is used.
-
Relationships among Democratic Freedoms in the Former Soviet Republics:
A Causality Analysis
(pdf)
Constitutional Political Economy
21: 80-96, 2010
Abstract. Empirical studies often use Freedom House ratings for Political Rights and/or Civil Liberties as institutional proxies for the degree of democracy. In this study, Granger-causality tests are used which reveal that Political Rights tend to precede Civil Liberties, but not the reverse, in a panel data set of former Soviet Republics. For transition nations, Freedom House also publishes a separate breakdown of democratic characteristics. Empirical tests suggest Civil Society and Judicial Framework Granger-cause Electoral Process, Governance Granger-causes Civil Society, and all four components Granger-cause Independent Media. Each measure of democracy is related to at least one other but no evidence for dual causation is found.
-
Aid, Economic Freedom, and Growth
(pdf)
(with Stephen Knack)
Contemporary Economic Policy
27: 46-53, 2009
Abstract. Foreign aid has often been intended by donors to entice recipient nations into policy and institutional reforms favorable to private sector economic development. In this study, we investigate the relationship between aid and changes to economic freedom in recipient nations over the 1990-2000 decade. The evidence is mixed. In general we find that foreign aid has no significant effect on economic freedom overall. However, by utilizing an hedonic approach on the different categories of economic freedom we find that aid has still managed to contribute toward a policy and institutional environment favorable to growth, as the different categories of economic freedom improved by aid more than offset those which are harmed by aid, in terms of their impact on growth.
-
Convergence of Voter Turnout Rates in U.S. Presidential Elections
(pdf)
Review of Regional Studies
38: 251-269, 2008
Abstract. Convergence tests are performed on state level turnout rates for U.S. presidential elections from 1896 to 2004. The degree of dispersion in turnout has steadily declined since 1940, suggestive of general overall convergence taking place. Individually, it is found that 29 of the 48 continental states are stationary in their relative trend levels, and 42 states either do not significantly differ from the national average or are significantly trending toward the national average. In total, 25 of the 48 states pass tests for both stochastic and ß-convergence, suggesting that national convergence is being achieved by roughly half the states.
-
A Rational Choice Model for the Dakota Effect
(pdf)
PS: Political Science and Politics
41: 677-678, 2008
Abstract. In a recent issue, Young and Sigelman (2008) present evidence of a "Dakota effect," in which persons born in the Dakotas are disproportionately likely to represent their home state, other states, and also generate government spending directed toward the Dakotas. These authors are unable to explain the causal underpinnings for overrepresentation in Congress or the Dakotan natives' keen ability to direct pork back to these two states.
As is now well established, rational choice modeling can be successfully
employed to explain every political phenomenon under the sun, as well
as some over the sun. As such, a rational choice model will be employed here,
and using ficticious data, empirical analysis will be shown to corroborate the model.
We believe this to be a major breakthrough.
-
Voting on Slavery at the Constitutional Convention
(pdf)
(with Keith Dougherty)
AWARDED GORDON TULLOCK PRIZE FOR BEST ARTICLE IN PUBLIC CHOICE BY YOUNGER SCHOLAR(S)
Public Choice
136: 293-313, 2008
Abstract. This paper provides the first empirical study of delegate voting behavior on issues of slavery at the U.S. Constitutional Convention. We analyze two categories of votes: those related to apportionment and those related to the regulation of the slave trade. Although it is widely believed that delegates voted consistent with the interests of their states on issues of slavery, we find that for votes on apportionment, the effect of state interests was enhanced by both the delegate's personal interest and his religious background. For votes regulating the slave trade, state interests had a significant effect but only within specific regions.
-
Foreign Aid and Market Liberalizing Reform
(pdf)
(with Stephen Knack)
Economica
75: 524-548, 2008
Abstract. Market-oriented economic policies have been strongly linked to faster rates of economic growth. Foreign
aid is often provided in part to encourage market-oriented reforms. We analyse the impact of aid on
market-liberalizing policy reform, correcting for its potential endogeneity. Results indicate that higher aid
slowed reform over the 1980-2000 period, as measured by a broad index of policies. Disaggregating policy
into five areas, aid is associated with slower reform in some policy areas but not in others. Disaggregating
by decade, the adverse impact of aid on policy reform is much more pronounced for the 1980s than for the
1990s.
-
Joint Determination of Regulations by the Regulator and the Regulated: Commercial Bank Reserve Requirements, 1875-1979
(pdf)
(with John Wood)
Eastern Economic Journal
34: 158-171, 2008
Abstract. We apply the theory of clubs to bank decisions on choosing membership in the national system and being subject to federal regulations, or remaining outside the system and opting instead for state regulation. Although costs to national membership are typically higher, member banks can use their influence to reduce these costs. This is expected to be more prominent for the larger banks, which retain greater influence on the regulators. Thus, the theory predicts membership depends on costs, which in turn depend on membership. We test these relationships in a system of simultaneous equations for the periods 1875-1913, 1914-1934, and 1935-1980. Our results are consistent with the notion of large bank memberships responding to changes in reserve ratios, and reserve ratios responding to membership rates for large banks. In addition, we find bank sensitivity to national reserve ratios to be lowest when the Fed was given additional discretion in setting reserve ratios post 1935, and federal regulator responsiveness to large bank membership was greatest during this time as well.
-
Senate Elections with Independent Candidates
(pdf)
(with Andrew Yates)
Journal of Theoretical Politics
20: 31-46, 2008
Abstract. Assuming strict two party competition, policy balancing models of the U.S. senate imply that senators from the same state will often be from opposite parties and have great ideological divergence. We analyze the effect of independent candidates on these implications. Our theoretical model implies the two state senators will generally not be from opposite parties and will be closer in ideological space than if they were elected under strict two party competition. Empirical analysis of senate composition from 1991-2002 supports the theory.
-
On Voting by Proportional Lottery
Korean Journal of Public Choice
2: 1-11, 2007
Abstract. Lottery rules are rarely used beyond breaking a tie vote. Yet, proportional lotteries have several attractive features which are discussed here. First, lotteries break the tyranny of the majority. Second, any proportional lottery which uses only a single round of voting to determine the lottery weights followed by a single weighted draw will ensure sincere preference revelation by the voters. Third, lotteries respect many of the general axiomatic principals invoked for social choice rules, in a probabilistic sense.
-
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited
(pdf)
(with Keith Dougherty)
Journal of Economic History
67: 829-848, 2007
Abstract. Empirical studies of delegate voting at the Constitutional Convention have relied on the same 16 roll call votes. This paper re-examines various assumptions used in the collection of these data. We first create a baseline regression. We then consider the effect of dropping delegates not in attendance, re-inferring the votes from primary sources, examining various sub-samples of the roll calls, and reconstructing constituency variables to include state districts. Our findings suggest that for decision making at the Constitutional Convention, personal interests were indeed important but constituent interests were less important than previously claimed.
-
Special-Interest Groups and Volatility
(pdf)
(with Dennis Coates and Bonnie Wilson)
Economics Bulletin
Vol 15, No. 18: 1-13, 2007
Abstract. This paper explores the relationship between special-interest groups and volatility of GDP growth. In an unbalanced panel of 108 countries,
we find a significant negative relationship between the number of interest groups in a country and the volatility of GDP growth.
-
Determinants of Interest Group Formation
(pdf)
(with Dennis Coates and Bonnie Wilson)
Public Choice
133: 377-391, 2007
Abstract. It is widely recognized that interest groups affect both microeconomic and macroeconomic outcomes. However, few researchers have attempted to discern empirically the factors that contribute to interest group activity. This paper provides a test of several theories of group formation in a panel setting. A nation's stability, socioeconomic development, political system, size, and diversity all appear to contribute to interest group formation as predicted by theory.
-
Explaining the Rain: The Rise and Decline of Nations after 25 years
(pdf)
Southern Economic Journal
74: 18-33, 2007
Abstract. In the quarter-century since the publication of Rise and Decline of Nations, a large literature has evolved testing the central hypothesis regarding Olson's thesis on institutional sclerosis. These tests have taken the form of both econometric regression analysis involving a sample of various nations and detailed narrative case studies of specific nations. Tests have appeared in both economics and political science journals, as well as in collected volumes and independent books, performed primarily by authors from America and Europe. A review of over 50 separate works reveals that on the whole the theory of institutional sclerosis is generally, but certainly not universally, supported. No systematic bias in favor or opposition to Olson is found to have arisen based on methodology, publication outlet or authorship location.
-
Voting on Voting with the Feet: A Cross-County Analysis of the Tennessee Popular Refernda to Secede from the Union
(pdf)
(with John Dinan)
Constitutional Political Economy
18: 83-97, 2007
Abstract. We analyze a unique case of voting on voting with the feet, when Tennessee twice considered secession from the Union in 1861 by popular referenda. The initial votes to hold a convention, and to send disunion delegates to a convention, failed, but after the Confederate states adopted a new constitution and the bombing of Fort Sumter took place, a second set of votes to separate from the union, and to join the confederacy, passed. Regression results support the importance of both economic interests and political tendencies, along with regional differences, in explaining the variation in votes across counties. Class distinctions were not found to be significant.
-
A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State:
Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention
(pdf)
(with Keith Dougherty)
American Political Science Review
100: 297-302, 2006
Abstract. Robertson (2005) argues that Roger Sherman was surprisingly influential at the
constitutional convention. Using empirically estimated ideal points, we show that Sherman was
indeed a pivotal voter from a pivotal state. However, we also demonstrate that if the votes were
tallied by delegates individually, rather than grouping them by home state, then Sherman would
have been less pivotal. This suggests that the voting procedures adopted at the constitutional
convention may have affected Sherman’s ability to get his interests enacted. Such institutions
might have been more responsible for making Sherman influential than his legislative abilities.
-
Another Look at the Evidence for Rational Partisan Cycles
(pdf)
Public Choice
126: 257-274, 2006
Abstract. In presenting evidence in favor of rational partisan cycles,
where electoral victories by leftist parties are expected to create temporary expansions
and electoral victories by rightist parties are expected to create temporary recessions,
Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1999) rely upon autoregressive time series intervention regressions.
Theses regressions, however, are not consistent with their model. In this paper, a model is
derived which is consistent with the intervention approach in its reduced-form.
The differences between the models are highlighted and new empirical estimates are presented
on a panel of seven OECD nations, which generally does not support the rational partisan cycle
implications.
-
Do Economists Differ from Political Scientists on Public Choice? Evidence from a Survey
(pdf)
(with Robert Whaples)
Korean Journal of Public Choice
1: 35-41, 2006
Abstract. Economists and political scientists are thought to disagree on many topics, including those in the field of public choice which overlap the two disciplines. To better determine if this is true, and on which public choice topics in particular there is disagreement or consensus, we circulated a survey of public choice questions to random members of the American Economics Association and American Political Science Association. Analysis of the returned questionnaires suggests normative differences appear to be more systematic than are differences in the beliefs of basic modeling assumptions, which may influence the conclusions drawn regarding the outcomes.
-
Proxies for Economic Freedom: A Critique of the Hanson Critique
(pdf)
Southern Economic Journal
72: 492-501, 2005
Abstract. Economic freedom indicators have become quite popular recently as a useful tool to quantify the relationship between a country's institutions and its prosperity. Hanson (2003) criticizes these types of studies for: (1) failing to adequately distinguish between different proxies for economic freedom, (2) not considering the potential for endogeneity, and (3) for accepting significance of economic freedom's ability to promote prosperity even though regression analysis generates "nonsensical" results. Closer inspection reveals that most of his arguments are questionable, do not apply to much of the literature, or are not original, and that he is guilty of misinterpreting his own econometric evidence relating freedom to the level of GDP.
-
Political Monetary Cycles under Alternative Institutions: The Indepedent Treasury and the Federal Reserve
(pdf)
(with John Wood)
Economics and Politics
17: 331-350, 2005
Abstract. The theory of opportunistic political business cycles predicts incumbent politicians will alter their economic policies to spur short-run growth to attract additional votes for the upcoming election. There has not been much emphasis on the possibility of historical political business cycles prior to the Keynesian Revolution. No study has yet undertaken a systematic approach to testing for policy cycles during this period. Our study will bridge this gap by considering cycles in monetary policy for the periods of 1879-1914 until the start of Fed operations, and 1914-1932 until abandonment of the gold standard. To properly test for political cycles, it is necessary to develop reaction functions for the Treasury and compare against the reaction function later held by the Fed. This also reveals that creation of an independent monetary authority to be insulated from political pressures changed the manner in which policy was directed, aside from political issues. The evidence is not consistent, however, with monetary cycles closely tied to electoral concerns.
-
The Anti-Tobacco Movement during the Progressive Era: A Case Study of Direct Democracy in Oregon
(pdf)
(with John Dinan)
Explorations in Economic History
42: 529-546, 2005
Abstract. Little attention has been given to the cigarette bans that were enacted by many states in the late-19th and early-20th century. The recent study by Alston et al. (2002) represents the only empirical analysis of this issue. Alston et al., as typical for many other studies of historical regulatory movements, rely on legislative vote outcomes. In this article we examine the only occasion when a cigarette ban was put to a popular vote, in Oregon in 1930, and highlight the benefits of studying direct democratic votes to assess support for regulatory movements. To study the relationship between the anti-cigarette movement and other reform movements of the era, we compare the determinants of support for the cigarette ban with support for an Oregon alcohol prohibition referendum in 1933. Our results suggest that supporters of both reform movements were more likely to be found in counties with higher percentages of women, evangelical Protestants, and rural residents, which contrasts with Alston et al.’s study of state legislative behavior. In addition, greater support for alcohol prohibition in particular was found in counties with a larger percentage of immigrants and, to a lesser extent, more registered Republicans.
-
A Comparison of Aggregation Methods for Measures of Economic Freedom
(pdf)
(with Michael Stroup)
European Journal of Political Economy
21: 953-966, 2005
Abstract. Empiricists have used various editions of an economic freedom index (EFI) initially developed by Gwartney, Lawson and Block (1996) to examine the relationship between economic freedom and other socio-economic variables, such as growth or investment. The EFI quantifies the level of particular institutional characteristics thought to promote economic freedom and aggregates them into a single index value. The aggregation procedures utilized by Gwartney and Lawson in developing their index have changed over time and other scholars have promoted alternative methods. We examine several index aggregation procedures and show that each design may have potential methodological flaws which can greatly affect the empirical findings.
-
Public Choice Economics: Where Is There Consensus?
(pdf)
(with Robert Whaples)
American Economist
49: 66-78, 2005
Abstract. Are Public Choice scholars' conclusions accepted by rank-and-file economists and political scientists? If not, why not? To answer these questions we use survey results to compare the conclusions of self-identified public choice scholars with those in the adjacent disciplines of economics and political science. We examine thirty-five propositions in seven areas: (1) assumptions about political actors; (2) normative beliefs about government and voting; (3) elections and economic performance; (4) parties, platforms, voting and preferences; (5) government's purposes and growth; (6) individual behavior--voting-with-feet and free riding; and (7) government and the market. We conclude that, although there is a consensus on many of the issues, there is substantial remaining disagreement on many questions that appears to be tied to the competing presuppositions of scholars in economics and political science.
-
Fractionalization Effect and Government Financing
(pdf)
(with Hakan Berument)
International Journal of Applied Economics
2: 37-49, 2005
Abstract. The weak government argument claims that fractionalized
governments (coalition or minority governments) have more difficulty increasing their tax revenues or
decreasing their spending than majority governments. This implies that weaker governments are associated
with higher government deficits. In this paper, we test the implication of a fractionalization effect
within the optimum financing model that suggests governments raise both their tax and seigniorage revenues
to finance additional spending. We test the hypothesis for a sample of ten OECD countries for the period
1975-1997 and extend the period for the non-EU nations in the sample to cover 1975-2003. The empirical
evidence presented here supports a positive relationship between the degree of fractionalization and
seigniorage revenue. Our results also suggest that creation of seigniorage revenue is lower under
right-wing governments and an independent central bank.
-
Winning Probabilities in a Pairwise Lottery System with Three Alternatives
(pdf)
(with Fred Chen)
Economic Theory
26: 607-617, 2005
Abstract. The pairwise lottery system is a multiple round voting procedure which chooses by lot a winner from a pair of alternatives to advance to the next round where in each round the odds of selection are based on each alternative's majority rule votes. We develop a framework for determining the asymptotic relative likelihood of the lottery selecting in the final round the Borda winner, Condorcet winner, and Condorcet loser for the three alternative case. We also show the procedure is equivalent to a Borda lottery when only a single round of voting is conducted. Finally, we present an alternative voting rule which yields the same winning probabilities as the pairwise lottery in the limiting case as the number of rounds of the pairwise lottery becomes large.
-
A Spatial Model of U.S. Senate Elections
(pdf)
AWARDED INAUGURAL GORDON TULLOCK PRIZE FOR BEST ARTICLE IN PUBLIC CHOICE BY YOUNGER SCHOLAR
Public Choice
118: 87-103, 2004
Abstract. The importance of primary elections is considered
within the context of U.S. Senate elections where senators serve overlapping
terms and voters are assumed to balance their two senators against each other.
Voters behave strategically in the primaries but convergence to the median position
is not achieved except as a knife-edge result. More generally, constraints in
the party space prevent the party of the sitting senator from obtaining the
median's preference allowing the opposition party to nominate a candidate further
away from the median while still capturing the median voter. Empirical evidence
supports the notion that senate divergence is a function of the state primary
system.
-
The Secret Ballot Protects the Incumbency
Advantage
(pdf)
The Independent Review
8: 419-425, 2004
Abstract. This paper outlines a theory in which incumbent
candidates are shown to benefit from secret ballot laws. The role of private
information is central to this result which can be explained as follows. First,
bribery is expected to occur under an open ballot system but not under secret
ballots since voters need not reveal their underlying preferences. Second, since
vote-buying efficiency differs between candidates when voter distributions are
unequal, candidates possessing an incumbency advantage are shown to be relatively
inefficient and thus benefit from eliminating the vote market.
-
Are Public Choice Scholars Different?
(pdf)
(with Robert Whaples)
PS: Political Science and Politics
36: 797-799, 2003
Abstract. Critics of public choice analysis argue that
these scholars are different. They are self-selected into the field, their arguments
and conclusions are dominated by their personal ideological positions, and therefore
other scholars do not accept their results. A survey of members of the Public
Choice Society, American Economic Association, and American Political Science
Association shows that most of the public choice propositions accepted by public
choice scholars are also accepted by general economists, but less so by general
political scientists.
-
Interest Groups and Investment: A Further Test of
the Olson Hypothesis
(pdf)
(with Dennis Coates)
Public Choice
117: 333-340, 2003
Abstract. Mancur Olson's institutional sclerosis hypothesis may be evident in the effects of
interest groups on investment in physical capital. To test this proposition, we use cross sectional data on 42
countries for which information on the number of interest groups is available to estimate the
effect of those groups on the share of GDP that goes into physical investment. The results indicate that interest groups
have a different effect on physical investment in OECD and non-OECD countries. In the OECD countries, we find support
for the hypothesis that interest groups harm investment in physical capital. In developing countries, interest groups
either have no effect on physical investment or they have a slight beneficial impact.
-
Absolute and Relative Effects of Interest Groups on
the Economy (pdf)
(with Dennis Coates)
Collective Choice: Essays in Honor of Mancur Olson
(Jac C. Heckelman and Dennis Coates(eds.)), Springer-Verlag, pp. 129-142, 2003
Abstract. We test for the impact of interest groups on
economic growth among the OECD nations. We find more evidence of an absolute
effect from the number of groups than a relative effect of the number of groups
compared to the size of government. The effects are non-linear, as additional
group formation is less harmful the more groups that already exist, although
total growth would still be hampered by their presence. When controlling for
the absolute number of groups, the relative measure has no additional impact,
but controlling for the relative measure increases the estimated average effect
of the absolute number of groups. In addition, the negative influence of a given
number of interest groups on growth is lessened over time.
-
Probabilistic Borda Rule Voting
(pdf)
Social Choice and Welfare
21: 455-468, 2003
Abstract. An alternative voting system, referred
to as probabilistic Borda rule, is developed and analyzed. The winning alternative
under this system is chosen by lottery where the weights are determined from
each alternative's Borda score relative to all Borda points possible. Advantages
of the lottery include the elimination of strategic voting on the set of alternatives
under consideration and breaking the tyranny of majority coalitions. Disadvantages
include an increased incentive for strategic introduction of new alternatives
to alter the lottery weights, and the possible selection of a Condorect loser.
Normative axiomatic properties of the system are also considered. It is shown
this system satisfies the axiomatic properties of the standard Borda procedure
in a probabilistic fashion.
-
And a Hockey Game Broke Out: Crime and Punishment
in the NHL
(pdf)
(with Andrew Yates)
Economic Inquiry
41: 705-712, 2003
Abstract. We apply the economic theory of crime to the
National Hockey League. We analyze a natural experiment in which games during
the 1999-2000 season had either one or two referees. We determine the effect
of the number of referees on both the number of penalties called and the number
of rules infractions committed by players. The results indicate that increasing
the number of referees leads to greater enforcement of the rules but does not
significantly deter players from committing infractions.
-
On the Measurement of Comparative Economic Freedom
Across Nations
(pdf)
International Journal of Business
and Economics
1: 251-261, 2002
Abstract. The measurement of economic freedom is discussed.
One particular set of freedom indices, developed by Heritage Foundation, is
detailed including how the indices are constructed and potential problems in
the methodological design. Comparisons are made for the different levels of
freedom individual nations and regions achieve.
-
Electoral Uncertainty and the Macroeconomy: The Evidence
from Canada
(pdf)
Public Choice
113: 179-189, 2002
Abstract. The partisan advantage and incumbency advantage
versions of the rational partisan business cycle model are tested. Both models
assume agents form weighted averages of partisan inflation rates during an election
period, and differ only in how the weights are formed which alters the form
of business cycles. The partisan advantage assumes fixed weights designated
for both major parties in each election, whereas the incumbency advantage model
assumes fixed weights for whichever is the incumbent and opposition party in
each election. The symmetric representation assumes each election is a toss-up.
Strongest support is found for a temporary symmetric effect on the level of
output, but none of the models are supported for temporary electoral changes
in growth or unemployment rates.
-
Variable Rational Partisan Business Cycles: Theory
and Some Evidence
(pdf)
Canadian Journal of Economics
35, 568-585,
2002
Abstract. The Variable Rational Partisan Business Cycle
model is developed, where agents face uncertainty regarding the timing and outcome
of the next election. The model predicts that partisan influences on the economy
persist throughout the government's rule, and are further influenced, in the
opposite direction, by which party ruled in the previous period. Party popularity
also has a causal effect on the business cycle. Finally, the effects from changes
in election timing expectations are dependent on which party ruled in the previous
period. Empirical results for output and unemployment in Canada, Germany and
United Kingdom yield mixed support for the model.
-
Incumbency Preservation through Electoral Legislation:
The Case of the Secret Ballot
(pdf )
(with Andrew Yates)
Economics of Governance
3, 47-57, 2002
Abstract. The secret ballot
was designed to eliminate the incentive for candidates to purchase votes through
direct vote buying. When voters have private information on their candidate
preferences, incumbent candidates will generally be less efficient in purchasing
votes than their challengers. Incumbent candidates may therefore benefit from
the elimination of direct vote purchasing. Viewed in this vein, passage of secret
ballot laws by state legislatures can be seen as an institutional mechanism
to protect their incumbency advantage, rather than as an act of necessary electoral
reform to create fair elections and protect democracy.
-
Size of the Military Sector and Economic Growth: A
Panel Data Analysis of Africa and Latin America
(pdf)
(with Michael Stroup)
Journal of Applied Economics
4, 329-360,
2001
Abstract. We estimate the influence of defense spending
and military labor use on economic growth in African and Latin American countries.
Our model integrates disparate implications from the defense economics literature
into a Barro-style model of economic growth that controls for political and
economic institutional variation across countries. Our panel data analysis of
44 countries in Africa and Latin America from 1975 to 1989 also controls for
cross-country variation in lost human capital and public sector production inefficiencies.
We find empirical evidence that the defense burden on economic growth is non-linear,
with low levels of military spending increasing economic growth but higher levels
of military spending decreasing growth. We also find evidence that the influence
of military labor use on growth is non-linear, and exhibits a greater drag on
economic growth in those countries with relatively higher levels of adult male
education attainment.
-
Rent-Setting in Multiple Winner Rent-Seeking Contests
(pdf)
(with Andrew Yates)
European Journal of Political Economy
17, 835-852, 2001
Abstract. In this paper we analyze a multiple winner
rent-seeking contest where the number of winners is set by a self-interested
regulator. The winners receive a license to compete in a market. The structure
of competition in the market influences the number of winners through the preferences
of the regulator. The model implies that Cournot competitors are often better
off than firms that are able to collude on output determination.
-
Partisan Business Cycles under Variable Election Dates
(pdf)
Journal of Macroeconomics
23, 261-275,
2001
Abstract. This paper develops a model where rational
economic agents face uncertainty regarding the timing of elections and which
party will emerge victorious should an election occur. This electoral uncertainty
affects the macroeconomy, where the size and direction of the impacts are dependent
on the party in power in the current and previous period, time elapsed since
the last election, and party popularity. Leftist governments are expected to
sustain higher output levels throughout their electoral term compared to rightwing
governments, and the partisan differences will continue to increase until the
next election.
-
The Econometrics of Rational Partisan Theory
(pdf)
Applied Economics
33, 417-426, 2001
Abstract. This paper develops an econometric intervention
model representing the standard empirical approach to testing Alesina's (1987)
Rational Partisan Theory implication that elections lead to short-term changes
in output growth and unemployment. This intervention approach may be subject
to two econometric difficulties. First, the cyclical nature of the autoregressive
variables suggest the regression residuals may be serially correlated. Second,
the election intervention variable may be endogenous to the cyclical variables.
Empirical support for the model is mixed. Ordinary Least Squares estimates for
both series produce a coefficient for the intervention variable which is of
the predicted sign but not significant. The output growth regression results
are robust to serial correlation and endogeneity concerns. For unemployment,
controlling for serial correlation generates a significant coefficient, but
adjusting for endogeneity does not.
-
Which Economic Freedoms Contribute to Growth?
(pdf)
(with Michael Stroup)
Kyklos
53, 527-544, 2000
Abstract. The literature on economic freedom and growth
has utilized summary measures of freedom to determine its general significance
for economic growth. We believe the summary measures lead to misspecification
problems. We utilize Heston-Summers growth data to determine which of the disaggregated
categories of economic freedom lead to growth and find that only a few of the
indexes significantly affect growth. These growth regressions generate new weights
for aggregating the indexes into an overall summary measure. This new measure
can be interpreted as deriving a relative ranking of nations that have a relatively
higher presence of growth promoting economic freedoms and more restrictions
on those economic freedoms that inhibit growth.
-
Consistent Estimates of the Impact of Special Interest
Groups on Economic Growth
(pdf)
Public Choice
104, 319-327, 2000
Abstract. Empirical studies designed to test Olson's
(1982) theory of institutional sclerosis are typically forced to rely upon proxies
to measure the ability of special interest groups to engage in redistributive
activities, which in turn are expected to hinder economic growth. This note
shows that reliance on proxies biases the estimates toward zero. Here, instrumental
variable routines are utilized which increase the estimated impact of special
interests on the economy.
-
Economic Freedom and Economic Growth: A Short-run
Causal Investigation
(pdf)
Journal of Applied Economics
3, 71-91,
2000
Abstract: The freedom and growth literature has consistently
shown that nations which have fewer restrictions on private agents and transactions
tend to higher levels of economic growth. It is less clear, however, whether
freedom causes growth, growth causes freedom, or the two are jointly determined.
To assess these possibilities, Granger-causality tests are performed on annual
freedom indicators developed by the Heritage Foundation and national growth
rates. The underlying component indexes, which include Trade Policy, Taxation,
Government Intervention, Monetary Policy, Capital Flows and Foreign Investment,
Banking, Wage and Price Controls, Property Rights, Regulation, and Black Markets,
are also tested in addition to the summary freedom rating. The tests suggest
the average level of freedom in a nation, as well as many of the specific underlying
components of freedom, precedes growth. However, growth may precede one of the
component indexes (Government Intervention), and no relationship is found to
exist between growth and two of the indexes (Trade Policy and Taxation).
-
Sequential Elections and Overlapping Terms: Voting
for U.S. Senate
(pdf)
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
42, 97-108, 2000
Abstract. This paper presents a model in which voters
attempt to balance the ideological positions of their senate representatives.
Candidate positions are determined endogenously through a primary system. The
median voter theorem is applied in each election to determine winning platforms
based on voter preferences which may differ from their individual bliss points.
Contrary to the original median voter theorem, the main implications of this
model are that: (i) convergence on platform positions is not achieved in the
general election, and (ii) extremist candidates defeat moderates in the stable
long-run equilibrium.
-
Revisiting the Relationship Between Secret Ballots
and Turnout: A New Test of Two Legal-institutional Theories
(pdf)
American Politics Quarterly
28, 194-215,
2000
Abstract. Two theories within the legal-institutional
framework concerning the Australian Ballot System's effect on voter turnout
are analyzed. The vote market hypothesis assumes secret ballots were designed
to end the buying and selling of votes. The secrecy the new ballot provided
discouraged candidates from buying votes they could no longer verify, disproportionately
affecting poor voters who would respond to this loss of payments by voluntarily
abstaining. Alternatively, the theory of strategic disfranchisement predicts
blacks and illiterates were specifically targeted for disfranchisement. The
new ballots were expected to be more difficult for these voters to use and they
would then be effectively prevented from participating in the active electorate.
Although turnout decreases under either theory, the normative implications are
very different. Controlling for race and illiteracy, regression analysis suggests
poor voters were less likely to vote a secret ballot. A similar effect is not
found for black and illiterate voters when controlling for income. The evidence
is thus more consistent with the vote market hypothesis than a pure disfranchisement
effect.
-
Testing Rational Partisan Theory when Elections are
Endogenous Events: Some Empirical Evidence from the United Kingdom
(pdf)
Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics
38, 45-56, 1999
Abstract. Rational partisan theory predicts macroeconomic
fluctuations are triggered by possible changes in government policies due to
elections. Empirical testing may fall prey to an endogeneity problem when incumbent
governments determine the timing of an election and voters respond to current
economic conditions in their choice of party support. Hausman tests suggest
elections in Britain are endogenous to growth and stronger support is found
for rational partisan theory using an instrumental variable routine.
-
Adaptive Partisan Theory
Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice
17, 11-18, 1999
Abstract. Previous empirical studies designed to test
the rational expectations partisan model of Alesina [1987] have generally looked
for changes in real macroeconomic variables following a change in party power
(incumbent party loss), whereas the model predicts these variables should fluctuate
in a predictable manner even when the incumbent party is reelected. It is shown
in this paper that the previous evidence is supportive of a partisan policy
model where agents employ adaptive expectations, in which case only changes
in party power lead to partisan economic fluctuations of real variables.
-
Federal Reserve Membership and the Banking Act of
1935: An Application to the Theory of Clubs (pdf)
(with John Wood)
Public Choice Interpretations of American Economic
History
(Jac C. Heckelman, John C. Moorhouse, and Robert Whaples
(eds.)), Kluwer Academic Press 147-161, 1999
Abstract. Between 1914 and 1980 state-chartered banks
were free to accept or forgo the costs and benefits of Federal Reserve membership.
Their decisions were sensitive to changes in the burden of the Fed's reserve
requirements caused by fluctuations in interest rates. But large banks were
less likely than small banks to change their membership status, especially after
the Fed acquired discretion over its reserve requirements in 1935. These choices
fall within the theory of clubs and illustrate rent seeking, voting with the
feet, and the exploitation of the great by the small. We develop a model of
the Fed's determination of the conditions of membership subject to expected
bank responses and then formalize the membership decisions of profit-seeking
banks taking account of their possible influences on the Fed. In essence, all
banks are likely to vote with their feet depending on membership costs, but
small banks may free ride on large bank lobbying of the Fed for reduced reserve
ratios. This effect should be stronger after the New Deal enhancements of Fed
discretionary powers.
-
Financing Divided and Unified Partisan Governments
(pdf)
Applied Economics Letters
5, 789-791,
1998
Abstract. By modifying Berument's divided government-optimum
financing model to include partisan interests, it is found that when the Democratic
party controls both the Congress and Presidency, real monetary base grows at
a higher rate than when the Republican party controls both branches. In addition,
it is found that monetary base grows at the slowest rate when neither party
controls both branches, supporting a gridlock version of divided government.
-
Employment and Gubernatorial Elections during the
Gilded Age
(pdf)
Economics & Politics
10, 297-309, 1998
Abstract. The theory of political business cycles predicts
economies will experience a short-run expansion during an election period. Cross-sectional
evidence from 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900, and 1910, does not reveal statistically
significant differences in gainful employment rates between states with and
without a gubernatorial election in that year. Pooled regression analysis suggests
gubernatorial elections are positively correlated with the state employment
rate, but an annual fixed effect model designed to account for differences in
the measurement of gainful employment mitigates this conclusion.
-
Bribing Voters without Verification
(pdf)
The Social Science Journal
35, 435-443,
1998
Abstract. This article distinguishes between two types
of vote buying mechanisms. If vote choices can be monitored, vote buyers will
not discriminate amongst prospective voters, regardless of how they are expected
to vote. If voting is secret, a vote buyer will pay opposition voters not to
vote which forces the opposition to pay its own voters to ensure they do vote.
This implies the secret ballot may be less effective in curbing bribery than
originally thought.
-
Political Business Cycles and Endogenous Elections
(pdf)
(with Hakan Berument)
Southern Economic Journal
64, 987-1000,
1998
Abstract. Empirical research of political business cycles
(PBCs) may suffer from endogeneity bias when incumbent governments have discretion
to call for an early election. Using an instrumental variable (IV) routine on
data from Japan and the U.K., we find strong evidence to support the notion
that election timing is a function of the economy rather than the macroeconomy
being driven by elections as assumed in PBC. In single-equation regressions,
no evidence of political cycles are found, but Hausman tests suggest elections
are endogenous in our regressions. A monetary cycle in Japan and an inflation
cycle in the U.K. are uncovered through IV estimation.
-
Determining who Voted in Historical Elections: An
Aggregated Logit Approach
(pdf)
Social Science Research
26, 121-134, 1997
Abstract. The ecological fallacy literature suggests
aggregate data cannot be used for microlevel inference. Building upon an aggregated
logit model developed by Kelejian (1995), I am able to show that the estimated
coefficients from aggregate data regressions are directly related to the true
underlying microcoefficients, so meaningful interpretations can still be made.
It is also suggested that in the cases where aggregation bias can be rejected,
the microcoefficients can be directly estimated. An application of the model
is shown using state-level data for historical elections in which survey data
are unavailable.
-
Railroads and Property Taxes
(pdf)
(with John J. Wallis)
Explorations in Economic History
34, 77-99,
1997
Abstract. Nineteenth century state and local governments
continued to invest in railroads and other internal improvement projects long
after it was clear that these projects were financially very risky. This paper
provides a motivation for public involvement in internal improvements by estimating
the effect of railroad construction on property values from 1850 to 1910. Using
Census data on true and assessed valuations, we find that the increase in property
values associated with railroad construction, would, at typical levels of taxation,
pay for a substantial share, if not all, of the construction costs solely on
the basis of property tax revenues. The effect of construction on property values
declined with mileage up to several thousand miles, which may explain why state
governments typically were involved in construction of the initial systems.
The effect, however, was nonlinear and increased at higher mileages, consistent
withe the persistent participation of county and municipal governments.
-
Political Business Cycles before the Great Depression
(pdf)
(with Robert Whaples)
Economics Letters 51, 247-251, 1996
Abstract. We test for the existence of political business
cycles using annual data for the period from 1869 to 1929, finding only weak
supportive evidence.
-
The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter Turnout Rates
(pdf)
Public Choice
82, 107-124, 1995
Abstract. Secrecy in the voting process eliminated an
important motivation for voting. No longer able to verify the voters' choices,
political parties stopped offering payments in return for votes. Within the
rational voter framework, it will be shown that these payments were a prime
impetus for people to vote. Without a vote market to cover their voting costs,
many voters were rational to stay away from the polls. This hypothesis is supported
through a series of empirical tests culminating in a multivariate legislative
regression. When other electoral laws are controlled for, the secret ballot
accounts for 7 percentage points lower Gubernatorial turnout.